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Building Communities of Interest 
Sharing 
the Pie 
The Boston Jobs Coalition 
• Chuck Turner 
On May 4, 1976, over 2,000 White union construction workers 
marched on Boston's City Hall demanding that the Third World 
Jobs Clearing House (TWJCH) be closed. These union workers 
maintained that TWJCH was providing support to Black, Asian, 
Latin and Native American workers who were picketing job sites 
throughout the city. Withdrawal of city funds, they argued, would 
stop these "illegal" demonstrations. 
TWJCH had grown out of an alliance of the Black, Latin, Asian 
and Native American communities to strengthen their communi-
ties' share in Boston's construction industry. The alliance had 
demonstrated its strength by winning city funding for TWJCH as 
a resource for workers of color to implement the city's affirmative 
action plan. When unions and contractors boycotted the Clearing 
House, frustrating its goals, workers took to the streets to demand 
their fair share through direct action. Picketing and often shutting 
down construction sites around the city, the workers had begun 
to win a handful of jobs on some of the sites. 
Two weeks after the demonstration by White workers, the 
• Chuck Turner was one of the organizers of both the Third World Jobs Clearing 
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Boston City Council voted 9 to 0 to cut TWJCH's funds. While 
Mayor Kevin White initially told his top Black aides that the funds 
would not be cut off since there was no evidence of a direct 
connection between the demonstrators and the Clearing House, 
seven months later, on the day before Thanksgiving, he signed 
the Council order revoking the funds. 
To many it seemed that affirmative action in Boston's construc-
tion trades was dead. Instead, these events gave birth to the Boston 
Jobs Coalition and a struggle that established an unprecedented 
policy of local hiring requirements in the construction industry. 
Search for New Allies 
The attack on TWJCH had alleged that any action to support 
affirmative action for workers of color was an attack on the 
interests of White Boston construction workers. In fact, the unions, 
with the majority of their members living in the suburbs, seemed 
to close the doors on White Boston workers as well as workers 
of color. 
As the advocates for integration of the trades assessed the 
situation, there seemed to be only one possible solution—an 
alliance between the communities of color and White communities 
in Boston. Such an alliance, it was theorized, could lead to a policy 
that would combine hiring requirements for workers of color and 
women with hiring requirements for Boston residents. 
Such a policy, unheard of anywhere in the country then, seemed 
to be the only way to create a political force that could advance 
affirmative action for workers of color and women. Otherwise, 
the unions, in an era when the Boston economy was moving from 
manufacturing to service, would use the frustration of unemployed 
White Boston workers to politically block any movement to 
seriously integrate the trades. 
The question of how to build such an alliance was complex since 
at that moment Boston was embroiled in continuous racial clashes 
over school integration and busing. In such a racially hostile 
atmosphere it seemed difficult to even develop a dialogue between 
White working-class communities and Boston's communities of 
color. However, there was one integrated neighborhood, Jamaica 
Plain, where there had been a recent history of Whites, Blacks 
and Latinos working together. While there was significant interest 
in working together to develop such a policy, there was also much 
skepticism about the possibilities of success. 
Discussions continued about the possibilities, but nothing 
concrete happened until two lawyers from the Lawyers Guild's 
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labor committee in Boston agreed to research legal precedents. 
Their research revealed that in the 1930s the Massachusetts 
legislature had established a law that when public works money 
was spent, 75% of the jobs had to go to residents of the districts 
in which the work was taking place. They also brought to light 
a Supreme Court ruling that said the City of Chicago had the right 
to require that Chicago police be residents of Chicago. 
It was clear that these precedents were a somewhat weak base 
to use for the development of such a groundbreaking policy. But 
they provided an argument in the neighborhoods that if we could 
build the political alliance, there would be a legal framework that 
the politicians could use for the policy. 
With the legal precedents in place, the next question was how 
to build the political alliance. Given the hostile atmosphere in 
Boston's segregated White working-class neighborhoods, it seemed 
that the most likely organizations in those communities that might 
be interested in such an alliance were the community development 
corporations (CDCs). The CDCs' need for political alliances in 
order to generate resources for their community development 
work had led to the development of relationships with organiza-
tions throughout the Boston area. Also, without a policy that would 
require a certain percentage of city residents, CDCs might have 
significant difficulty getting residents of their own neighborhoods 
onto projects they were themselves developing. 
The Boston Jobs Coalition 
Assisted by an intern from one of the Jamaica Plain CDCs, 
leaders from the Third World Jobs Clearing House and from 
organizations in Jamaica Plain began to make contact with CDCs 
and other similar organizations throughout Boston. After a six-
month effort, 40 organizations from eight neighborhoods had 
joined together to form the Boston Jobs Coalition (BJC). 
Once formed, the BJC membership focused on developing a 
policy that would join affirmative action for workers of color and 
women with a residency policy. Their deliberations led to a 
position that on any construction project financed or assisted by 
the city: 
—50% of the total hours, trade by trade, should go to Boston 
workers; 
—25% of the total hours, trade by trade, should go to workers 
of color, regardless of residency; and 
—10% of the total hours, trade by trade, should go to women, 
regardless of race or residency. 
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The 50% figure for residency was chosen based on the concept 
that while Boston workers had a right to a significant share, there 
needed to be an opportunity for workers from other areas to share 
in Boston's construction industry. The hope was that the initiation 
of the policy in Boston would lead to the adoption of similar 
policies in other cities and towns of Massachusetts, as well as in 
the country as a whole, establishing the framework for a rational 
sharing of locally produced benefits. 
25% was chosen as the figure for workers of color since that 
number represented the proportion of people of color in Boston's 
population. 10% for women was significantly below their percen-
tage of the population of the city, but given the low number of 
women trained for construction, 10% seemed to be a number that 
would encourage significant growth in the female population in 
construction. 
As the political discussion around this policy went forward, very 
few, even within the unions, argued against the merits of the 
policy. With residency coupled to affirmative action for workers 
of color and women, the policy was viewed as a fair way to cut 
the pie. However, city officials argued that despite the fairness 
of the policy, the political reality was that it was unlikely that 
Mayor White would be able to adopt a policy that was opposed 
by the suburban-controlled construction unions. 
For approximately a year discussions went forward with union 
and city officials, and yet there was no agreement to put the policy 
into action. During the 1979 primary race for mayor, all the major 
candidates endorsed the policy except Mayor White. However, two 
weeks before the final elections, the Mayor unexpectedly 
announced that he would sign an executive order that would apply 
the policy to any project financed by the city or assisted through 
a 121-A tax agreement, which provided a 40-year property tax cap 
for downtown developments. 
One of the significant political by-products of the development 
of the BJC and its policy initiative was that a Black candidate, Mel 
King, was able to campaign in every section of the city, even in 
previously hostile White neighborhoods, advocating an aggressive 
affirmative action policy in construction. The fact that the policy 
benefited all created a base of support that had never existed 
before. 
However, once Mayor White issued the executive order, follow-
ing his successful race for mayor, the unions and contractors joined 
forces to fight the issue in the courts. Their actions made it clear 
that sharing the job base with White Boston residents was as 
objectionable as, sharing it with workers of color and women. 
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The unions and contractors argued against the policy in court 
as an unfair restraint of trade. However, in a 1982 decision Judge 
William Rhenquist, writing for the majority in a 7-2 decision, said 
"parochial favoritism" to help revitalize a city and improve 
opportunities for local poor, minorities and unemployed workers 
is not unconstitutional. Once approved by the courts, the Boston 
City Council unanimously passed an ordinance making affirmative 
action part of Boston's legal landscape. 
After the Victory 
One of the peculiar ironies of the struggle was the fact that while 
the policy emerged victorious from the court battle, the Coalition 
collapsed under the weight of internal racial tensions. 
After the Mayor adopted the policy, the BJC obtained funds to 
hire staff to organize caucuses of White, Black, Latino, Asian and 
Native American workers. But disputes within the staff and 
organization quickly emerged around questions of how to organize 
the caucuses. Fears that the organization of a caucus of White 
workers would stimulate racism within the organization and 
frustration with the apparent unwillingness of many workers to 
join the struggle led to a policy battle that the organization was 
not strong enough to withstand. So by the time the Council had 
passed the ordinance, the Coalition had collapsed under the weight 
of internal tension. 
The analysis that emerged after the smoke had cleared suggested 
that there has to continually be consciousness-raising in building 
coalitions that attempt major policy change, particularly those 
involving race. The conclusion was that there was too much focus 
on winning the policy battle and not enough time spent on helping 
prepare the members for the strains that would emerge in the 
attempt to build a multiracial workers organization. 
By 1984 the absence of the BJC was acutely felt. Changes in 
tax laws removed the need for downtown developers to use the 
121-A tax benefit. Consequently, during a major period of 
downtown development, advocates for the policy saw that private 
industry was no longer covered. Quickly reviving the remnants 
of the alliance, political pressure was focused on Mayor Ray Flynn, 
who replaced Mayor White in 1983. Flynn had been a staunch 
supporter of the policy when he was on the City Council. 
Flynn's response to the pressure was to issue an executive order 
that extended the policy to all private construction over 100,000 
square feet. This meant that all the new downtown commercial 
buildings would automatica/ y be covered by the policy. 
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In 1986, as a response to pressure for a monitoring and enforce-
ment mechanism for the private work, Mayor Flynn introduced 
an ordinance establishing the Boston Employment Commission—a 
seven-person body appointed by the mayor with the responsibility 
of reviewing all projects covered by the policy to determine their 
compliance. There also is a provision that requires that one-tenth 
of 1% of the total construction costs be put into a bond so that 
if the project is in noncompliance, funds are available to pay fines. 
Is the policy working? Figures for the first half of fiscal 1988 
show that on private construction projects, totalling $1.3 billion, 
Boston residents got 29% of the hours worked; workers of color, 
14%, and women, 3%. On public projects during the same period, 
totalling $371 million, residents got 39%, workers of color, 25%, 
and women, 3%. Though these figures show gaps between the 
official requirements and the reality on the job, they represent 
a substantial improvement over 1980, when the plan was first 
implemented. 
New Challenges 
Without doubt, the residency policy has increased the share of 
work for Boston workers, workers of color and women. However, 
everyone acknowledges that at this point the key issue is not 
whether trained females, workers of color and Boston residents 
are being hired on Boston projects. The primary concern now is 
to achieve an agreement with the unions to train a sufficient 
number of workers of color, women and Boston residents to im-
plement the policy. Since there is a shortage of workers necessary 
to meet the policy's goals, an agreement to fully integrate the 
unions' apprenticeship programs is essential. 
Are we going to be able to develop such an agreement? It's 
unclear. It is clear that the unions are scrambling furiously to get 
public support for maintaining the state's prevailing wage law. 
Some of the unions have established preapprenticeship programs 
to assist Boston residents in qualifying for the apprenticeship 
programs. But whether the unions as a whole will negotiate a more 
far-reaching agreement regarding the apprenticeship program is 
questioned by many. 
In the early spring of 1988, Bill Fletcher, head of the Community 
Task Force on Construction, which represents the interests of 
people of color in Boston's construction industry, met with several 
high-level union officials. Initial talks produced an agreement to 
begin discussions regarding expansion of the apprenticeship 
program as well as an agreement to have the unions provide 
/ 
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membership statistics showing the degree of integration of workers 
of color in the trades. The statistics were viewed by the community 
as an essential part of the process since, while the unions had 
produced some figures favorably comparing the integration of 
union apprenticeship programs with existing nonunion programs, 
they have never made full disclosure of the composition of their 
membership. However, in late summer 1988, the promised 
statistics had not been made available, and conversations regarding 
training had not gone forward. 
While it is clear that there are significantly more workers of color 
now in the unions (even though the numbers cannot be fully 
documented) and that these workers and Boston workers are 
working in greater numbers on Boston projects, it is not clear how 
willing the unions are to open the apprenticeship programs in the 
ways necessary to meet the goals of the policy. While they want 
public help to protect the prevailing wage, many union officials 
still act as if the public should accept the apprenticeship programs 
as their private domains. 
This problem is complicated by a second major problem—the 
unwillingness of Governor Michael Dukakis to apply the residency 
policy to $14 billion of state construction work to be done in 
Boston over the next 10 years. The failure of the Governor to take 
that action makes it more difficult to get the unions to face up 
to their training responsibilities. If the Governor adopted the policy 
and made it clear that he was seriously going to enforce it, there 
would be additional leverage to get the unions to do the necessary 
training. 
So, while there has been improvement in the relationship 
between the unions and Boston's communities of color over the 
last 20 years, it is not clear that the unions fully accept their need 
for cooperation despite their rhetoric and the presence of some 
new and apparently sincere leadership who are attempting to build 
bridges. To many of us, it is time for the unions to realize that 
if they want broad public support, then they must be publicly 
accountable, particularly in the operation of their apprenticeship 
programs. • 
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